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COMMENTARY
TOWARD A PHENOMENOLOGY OF
CONTRACT· ADJUDICATION
Stewart T. Graham, Jr. *
Contract adjudication typically has been presented as a series
of objective facts which, taken as a whole, compel certain jural con
sequences. I That is, adjudication has been understood as the
aligning of conceptual abstractions, such as rules and principles,
with the facts of the case to reveal the conclusion of law. This char
acterization is applicable whether one invokes an analytical or nor
mative theory of law. Both types of theories generally treat law and
adjudication as structures existing apart from the individuals in
volved. Legal adjudication is seen as an existing structure through
which facts are sorted on their way to becoming the context for a
legal decision. This objectification of adjudication fails to account
for the subjective field of human action which gives meaning to
these "facts." Without a human subject there are no facts; without
a human subject there is no meaning. An act cannot be cut out of
history labeled, for example, an element of a contract, and pres
ented as a specimen for study. Acts have meaning only within an
intersubjective context which gives them meaning. A promise has
meaning, or is a promise, only within a relationship of individuals
who share an understanding of the world in general and of a cer
tain experience in particular.
Legal adjudication must be understood as a particular arena 'of
intersubjectivity in which individuals perform a certain activity
which has meaning only because of that background of intersub
jectivity. It is this background which provides structures for un
* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law.
B.A. 1967, J.D. 1970, University of Florida; L.L.M. 1973, S.J.D. 1974, University of
Virginia.
1. This is true even of natural law theorists, who although they conceive law as
deriving from some transcendental norm still objectify the process by which that
norm is applied in resolving disputes. Professor Peter Gable's article, addressing the
subjectivity of law, deals with the phenomenon of contractual condition as a vehicle
for the explication of law "from the interior." Gable, Intention and Structure in Con
tractual Conditions, 61 MINN. L. REV. 601 (1977).
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derstanding the world and the acts of others. It is a background of
commonality and familiarity which makes experience conventional.
If law and adjudication can be understood as lived responses to
conflicts occurring within a familiar structure of social life, then our
ability to teach and to understand law and adjudication, and to
restructure the legal process in ways more attuned to the human
situation underlying our cultural institutions will be improved.
This article presents legal adjudication as an activity of human
beings. The essential nature of adjudication is subjective and it is
inaccessible when the activity is objectified. Accordingly, this arti
cle presents an understanding of legal adjudication as a subjective
process, using contract adjudication as the context for the presenta
tion. 2 Furthermore, as this discussion develops, the superiority of
this subjective analysis over the traditional approach will become
clear.
The discussion proceeds in three sections. The first two pres
ent
a
, descriptive analysis of the adjudication of contractual disputes
dealing first with consideration and then with unconscionability.
The final section offers an analysis of adjudication through the phe
nomenon of minimal equality, which is described in the earlier sec
tions as the basis for the results reached in the adjudication dis
cussed therein. These two aspects of contract law have been
2. The methodology used is that of phenomenology and language philosophy.
The language philosophy most involved here is that of Ludwig Wittgenstein. See L.
WI1TGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (3d ed. G. Anscomb trans. 1958).
An attempt has been made to demystify phenomenology by translating its rather spe
cial vocabulary into ordinary language. This may result in some distortions of the
phenomenological account, but not to any great measure. Though generally thought
to be disparate, these philosophies are complementary in purpose. See 49 THE
MONIST (1964), which was devoted to a discussion of this relatedness, or rather
whether this relatedness in fact existed. See, e.g., E. Gendlin, What are the Grounds of
Explication? id. at 137; P. Kuntz, Order in Language, Phenomena and Reality, id. at
107. See also J. Wild, Is There a World of Ordinary Language? 67 PHILOSOPHICAL
REV. 460 (1958). None of these writers, nor this writer asserts a total harmony ex
isting below the surface of these philosophical methods. Just that their purpose is to
make the world in which we live more accessible to understanding through the de
scription of that world, i.e., the subjective world of everyday experience. They deal
with the world as it is lived, prior to any objectification for scientific analysis. This is
not to assert an anti-science attitude; it is to profess a commitment to the phenomena
themselves as they reveal themselves and as they are experienced, rather than to a
theoretical explanation of how or what they must be. Phenomenology speaks of this
"world" as a life world. By this is meant an horizon within which the phenomena of
our daily world are understood in a lived articulation of meaning. As John Wild has
stated it: "[Tlhe world horizon of human life is concrete, subjective, and relative to
man." Id.
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selected for discussion because of their familiarity and the interest
and controversy they generate. Finally, the article is intended to
be descriptive, not normative. Thus, questions such as whether
consideration or unconscionability are desirable concepts have not
been addressed.
CONSIDERATION

This section offers an analysis of consideration which reflects,
primarily, the understandings of language developed in ordinary
language philosophy. The importance of the perspective taken and
the relational analysis presented will become apparent as the
discussion proceeds. 3 Analysis of the concept of consideration be
gins with the role the term plays within legal discourse and, more
particularly, with regard to the speech situation in which it is used.
This would appear to be true of all linguistic phenomena. 4 Lan
guage is not a calculus with each term being a label for an object.
Clearly, some terms do perform a labeling function, but few, if
any, serve that function alone. For example, the term tree can be
used to label a particular physical object just outside a window, or
it can be used more broadly without reference to any particular ob
ject. Also, it can be used metaphorically-"He stood like a tree
. . . ." Further, using the term tree signals a botanical field in
which differentiations and relationships have been established and
which is contrasted with other fields of perceptual experience.
In the field of human action, however, the labeling function of
terms is nearly nonexistent. It is here that language is all important
because action takes place only in and through language. It is only
we who talk that can give voice to intentions, motives, causes,
fears and beliefs.5 In analyzing human action, the central concern
is with the purpose of the act, not the physical, causal factors. The
discourse about and of human action is performative. 6 For exam
3. For a good bibliography in the area of ordinary language philosophy see H.
PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 341, 341-50 (1972).
4. This is not to suggest that linguistic phenomena cannot be understood as as
pects of certain cultural structures, such as capitalism. See Gable, supra note 1. How
ever, concepts are acts of consciousness which are linguistic, as opposed to non
verbal acts, such as perception. Therefore, it is necessary to become oriented with
the linguistic field in which these phenomena are used.
5. H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 158 (1958). See also H. PITKIN, supra
note 3 (good discussion of the function of language).
6. J. L. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 233-53 (2d ed. 1970). Performative is
used not in the strict sense of J. L. Austin's definition which is that to speak or to
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pIe, the term "fact" is not a label for anything, nor do we create a
"fact" by using the term, but we do perform an action by and
through its use. To use "fact," one posits a perspective which one
assumes toward the phenomenon to which reference is made. One
also presupposes agreement regarding the phenomenon in the cul
ture or subculture which provides the background for the
discussion, and establishes criteria for judging disagreement, for
example, there is a difference between opinion and fact. To use the
term "fact" tells more about the speaker than it does about the
phenomenon being discussed. This is true of most terms used in
discourse of and about human action. Again, it is the point of the
action, not causal factors that is important. The point of an action is
always displayed against a background into which the action fits
and from which it derives meaning. To understand the meaning of
a term, one must analyze the speech situation of which it is a
part. 7 Any discussion of human action must be understood in terms
of the human situation which is constitutive of that action.
A court's use of the term "consideration" serves as a starting
point for analysis. One must not assume that that use is always the
same or always different. Furthermore, not only must the subjec
tive intention of the speaker be considered but also the objective
ambiance of the act is relevant. Actions are social phenomena, and
thus an understanding of actions requires all relevant perspectives
to be considered. The subjective intention of the action cannot be
ignored, but neither can it be given total dominance. It is neces
sary to step back from the action, to "loosen the intentional
threads"8 that tie us to the phenomenon, in order to see it in its
fullness. In this way, one can accredit the subjective intention
while placing the act within a broader social context to gain a more
complete understanding.
Use of the term "consideration" in an opinion signals the
court's perspective of the relationship existing between the parties
use the term is to perform the act, for example "to promise." To say "I promise" is to
perform the act of promising. Pitkin, following Wittgenstein, noted that all language
is performative, but in a looser sense than Austin's definition. Pitkin's definition is
quasi-performative. H. PITKIN, supra note 3, at 39.
7. See generally L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 2, §§ 21-23, at 10-11 & § 43, at
20.:21.
8. I have borrowed this phrase from Maurice Merleau-Ponty. M. MERLEAU
PONTY, Preface to PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION at XIII (C. Smith trans. 1970).
Intentionality is the opening out of consciousness onto the world; it holds us in the
world or ties us to it. The point here is to loosen those ties or that hold in order to
understand the phenomena which are being held in relation.
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of the lawsuit. It signals the existence of a legal system structured
to give force to that reiationship. The focus of this discussion is pri
marily on the quasi-performative function of the court's usage. The
court's use of the term "consideration" creates a jural relationship
with its attendant consequences, or terminates a conflict relation
ship in which the social and jural relational lines were skewed.
Terminating a conflict relationship is as much a positive act as
creating a jural relationship because it brings the parties into a dif
ferent relationship of classified responsibilities and consequences.
It is in this sense that courts use the term "consideration" affirma
tively both to. enforce and to deny enforcement to a purported
contract.
By stressing that consideration is a necessary "element" in a
contract, one may hinder a clear appreciation of the actual use of
the term by the courts. "Element," suggests some objective refer
ent, some piece to be fitted into the puzzle to complete the pic
ture. "Consideration" is a linguistic device which a court uses in an
appropriate speech situation to move the parties into a relationship
which expresses the court's understanding of the circumstances.
This may be a movement into or out of a contractual relationship.
It is not "part" of a "contract," but an expression of whether a con
tractual relation will be recognized.
Characterizing consideration as an "element" in a contract is
misleading both to consideration and to contracts. These terms are
used as concepts and have reality only within a linguistic system.
Thus, the word "contract" has sense because of its use, not because
it "exists." The term is used quasi-performatively to move parties
into a particular jural relationship with attendant consequences
imposed by the legal system. Authoritative use of the term "con
tract" discloses the perspective the speaker has of the relationship
of the parties with reference to whom the term was used. Such us
age creates an authoritative relationship for the parties, thus mov
ing them into a new position, but it does so along relational lines
already existing and against the background of the legal system.
The use of the term directs one's attention to considerations of
both the parties' relation to each other and their relation to the le
gal system.
The various perspectives from which consideration is viewed
are manifested in cases. What counts as consideration in particular
cases becomes the question. In what sense can the term "consider
ation" be used with reference to disparate factual situations? Com
pare for example, football, chess, solitaire, hop scotch and extem
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poraneous children's games. .What common properties do they
share, if any, which allows us to call them all games? What is the
difference between playing and playing a game? What are the con
sequences of calling an action a game, or calling it something else?
What are we doing when we use the term "game"?
These kinds of questions also can be raised about considera
tion. Consideration has been variously seen as an exchange of
promises, promise in return for performance, benefit to the prom
isor, detriment to the promisee and moral obligation. What com
mon properties do all these situations share, if any, which allows
the term "consideration" to be applied to them? What are the con
sequences of the use or non-use of consideration with reference to
any of those cases? What is being done when the term "considera
tion" is used?
It is necessary to look at the use of consideration in legal dis
course, restricted here to the common law, in order to disclose the
relatedness of the uses. This cluster of uses delineates the grammar
of the term which contains the germ of its meaning. Isolation of
the grammar of "consideration" allows one to adopt an intellectual
distance for the phenomenon and thus to identify a sense of mean
ing which transcends any particular instance of use.
The classic case of Hamer v. Sidway 9 provides a starting point
for analysis. It involved a promise by an uncle to pay his nephew
$5,000 on the latter's twenty-first birthday if the nephew would re
frain from drinking, using tobacco, swearing, and playing cards or
billiards for money until that time. The nephew complied with the
terms as he had promised, and his assignee sought enforce
ment. The nephew had actively relied on the promise, conforming
his actions to the terms of the agreement in order to reap the ben
efit of the promise. This active reliance induced by the promise
was termed consideration by the court, and the promise was en
forced. 10
The central question was whether the promise was a gift with
a condition or an offer for a contract. l l No conclusive argument can
be made for one instead of the other characterization. The crucial
point is enforceability. In the circumstances of the case, only the
contractual reading would yield enforceability since no delivery had
taken place to make the gift irrevocable. The answer revolves
about the question of why the court wanted to enforce. Professor
9. 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891).
10. ld. at 548, 27 N.E. at 257.
11. ld. at 545, 27 N.E. at 257.
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Lon Fuller asks what the result would have been if it were an ex
ecutory bilateral contract and the uncle sued upon the nephew's
breach. 12 Odds are that the court would have seen the uncle's
promise as one for a gift with a condition, in no way obligating the
nephew to take or to forbear from taking any action. To find obliga
tion here, without more involvement by the nephew, would be an
intolerable limitation on his freedom and would put him at the un
cle's mastery. This kind of relationship is too out of balance to be
enforced. Thus, even though a promise generally may be consider
ation, in this case it probably would not be. One can say that the
uncle was not asking for a promise, but for action. Therefore, the
nephew's promise was not the consideration requested. But if
the uncle were suing, then it would appear that he had accepted
the promise as sufficient to obligate the nephew, and himself, upon
its fulfillment. He saw it as being in exchange for and related to his
own promise. At that point of their relationship, however, the
probability is that no contract would be found.
The crucial factor is the relationship. The different legal con
clusions can be reconciled by studying the changes in the relation
ship of the parties from the hypothetical case to the actual case.
First, the active reliance by the nephew on the promise distorted
the relational lines structuring the uncle-nephew relationship ab
sent any counterbalancing obligation running from the uncle to the
nephew. This. relational imbalance is critical, as will be developed
more fully later. Secondly, an innocent third party, the assignee,
had also acted in reliance on the promise, thereby further skewing
the relationship. The nephew still would be liable on the underly
ing debt if no recovery was forthcoming from the uncle's estate.
This indicates additional reliance by the nephew and adds to the
relational imbalance and compels the court towards enforceability.
The degree to which imbalance must be manifested is the initial
question but it will be deferred until a few more cases are
reviewed.
Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 13 demon
strates quite clearly the point that the underlying relational balance
between the parties determines whether consideration exists and
whether the relationship should be called "contractual." The case
involved a federal procurement contract by which the plaintiff was
to deliver trap rock to an airport project as required by the defend
ant and the latter was to give appropriate delivery instructions.
12.
13.

Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 797,817 (1941).
150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945).
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Upon the defendant's failure to request delivery of trap rock within
a reasonable time after the contract was operative, plaintiff sued for
breach. Defendant moved for and was granted summary judgment,
arguing that a contractual provision allowing the defendant to can
cel the contract at any time rendered the contract illusory, that is,
the contract was without consideration from the defendant for the
plaintiff's promised performance. 14
The court looked to the intended relationship between the
parties, the one which was actually prevailing prior to the dispute:
"No one can read the document as a whole without concluding that
the parties intended a contract to re.sult. "15 Then the court consid
ered the relational balance which would attend the perspectives of
each party. The' defendant's position would require the plaintiff to
be bound to deliver but it did not bind the defendant to accept or
to pay. IS If no action had been taken by plaintiff, this may be a
reasonable argument, after all, the clause is rather absolute on its
face,17 and perhaps parties should be held to their contractual lan
guage. The plaintiff, however, had acted,18 and was holding itself
ready to continue performance. Thus, the language of the defend
ant's form contract was intended to and did induce reliance by' the
plaintiff, and did effect a change in their relationship. The parties
had entered into and were acting within a particular relationship.
By so inducing reliance, in terms of plaintiff's preparing for per
formance and its continued readiness to perform, the defendant
created a relationship in which, if any balance was to be manifest,
it must counterbalance plaintiff's obligations and actions. The court
found this counterbalance in an implied promise by the defendant
either to give delivery instructions or notice of cancellation within
a reasonable time after the contract was completed. 19 This was
characterized as the consideration given by defendant for plaintiff's
promise to deliver the rock. 20
Consideration here was implied or read in by the court be
cause of the existing relationship of the parties. 21 The relational
14.
15.

Id. at 643.
Id.
16. Id. at 644.
17. "Cancellation by the Procurement Division may be affected at any time."
Id. at 643.
18. At least four deliveries were made, and payment received. Id. at 644 n.!.
19. ld. at 644.
20. ld.
21. ld. at 645.
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imbalance which would have resulted from defendant's non
obligatory status within the relationship compelled the court to
enforce the contract. Reliance intentionally induced by defendant's
actions resulted in plaintiff's being placed in a grossly subservient
position vis-a-vis the defendant. The court monitored the relation
ship by using "good faith" as the relational standard against which
to judge the parties' action. 22 Good faith would preclude the de
fendant from taking advantage of such an unbalanced relation
ship.23 This reading of the circumstances clearly denotes the
proper judicial resolution. Worthy of examination is why the court
allowed the relationship to continue even though the plaintiff
incurred the greater risk.
Two final cases dealing with consideration present, perhaps,
the most difficult analytical problem., These cases, Webb v. Mc
Gowin 24 and Harrington v. Taylor,25 \involve. questions of moral
consideration. Whether moral obligations should or should not be
sufficient basis for consideration is a question outside the scope of
this article. Also, bracketed out from discussion is whether consid
eration is effective and efficient in operation. For present purposes,
moral obligation presents questions which are analytically impor
tant because it displays the internal vectors which aid in shaping
the doctrine of consideration.
In Webb, 26 the plaintiff had saved McGowin's life by holding
onto and diverting from McGowin a heavy pine block which plain
tiff had dropped from an upper level of a mill to the ground floor.
Plaintiff had acted properly in dropping the block in the course of
his duties. As a result of his actions, plaintiff was permanently crip
pled and could no longer work. McGowin promised to pay him fif
teen dollars every two weeks from the time of the injury through
out plaintiff's life. These payments were made until McGowin
died. His estate then refused to continue the payments and plain
tiff sued. The court held that McGowin had a moral obligation
arising out of his receipt of a material benefit and this obligation
was sufficient consideration to support a promise to pay.27
Harrington 28 involved a somewhat similar situation. The de
22. ld. at 643, 644.
23. ld.
24. 232 Ala. 374, 168 So. 199 (1936).
25. 225 N.C. 690, 36 S.E.2d 227 (1945).
26. See note 24 supra.
27. 232 Ala. at 375, 168 So. at 199.
28. ld.
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fendant had assaulted his wife and she took refuge in plaintiff's
house. On the next day defendant gained entrance to the house
and continued his assault. "[D]efendant's wife knocked him down
with an axe and was on the point of cutting his head open or
decapitating him . . . ,"29 when plaintiff intervened. Apparently,
she deflected the axe with her hand, saving defendant's life but
injuring her hand quite seriously. Subsequently, defendant prom
ised to pay plaintiff for her damages. He paid a small amount but
then discontinued payment and plaintiff sued. The court held that
plaintiff's actions were insufficient to provide consideration for de
fendant's promise. 3o
Again, the question of reconciling the different results on simi
lar factual patterns deserves attention. Both cases involve injury to
a person in(!urred while that person was saving the life of another,
who subsequently promises to make payment, does pay and then
payment is terminated. Clearly, legal decisions are not the mere
application of legal rules to sets of facts. As was argued implicitly in
Webb,31 the nature of the relationship of the litigants orients the
court toward the conclusion and determines the principles of law
which the court will choose to apply. The Restatement of Con
tracts 32 and Harrington 33 seem to imply that the critical factor in
cases of moral obligation is the relationship of the parties, including
the nature of the benefit received for which a promise to pay, or
render other benefit was given. The concern is whether the rela
tionship was such that a reciprocal benefit to the promisee was ex
pected or needed so as to inject a sense of fairness or relational
balance into the case. If the thesis advanced is an accurate descrip
tion of the legal process, then in these two cases, the courts must
have perceived either a relational imbalance which would be ad
justed through enforcement of the promise, or that enforcement
would create an imbalance. The Restatement reflects this percep
tion when it states:
Although in general a person who has been unjustly enriched at
the expense of another is required to make restitution, restitu
tion is denied in many cases in order to protect persons who
29. 225 N.C. at 690, 36 S.E.2d at 227.
30. Id.
31. 232 Ala. at 374, 168 So. at 199.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89A (Tent. Draft nos. 1-7, 1973).
Generally, contract law denies the legal efficacy of "moral consideration." 225 N.C.
at 690, 36 S.E.2d at 227.
33. 225 N.C. at 690, 36 S.E.2d at 227.
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have had benefits thrust upon them ... or to guard against false
claims .... 34
subsequent promise in ... a case [of emergency service] may
remove doubt as to the reality of the benefit and as to its value,
and may negate any danger of imposition or false claim. 35
A

In our two cases, however, there is no doubt as to the reality or
value of the benefit conferred. There is no doubt that the promises
were made; payments in fact were made in each case. What then
accounts for the differing results? The answer requires defining the
ground of legal decisionmaking.
Legal decisions are human actions which are judgments upon
other human action. Thus, the basis of a decision lies within the
intersubjectivity which structures the life world and makes the ac
tions of the parties and the judges understandable. This under
standing is based upon the subjective interpretation of the action
by the actor. 36 Individuals, at the first awareness, are in a shared
world and on the way toward realizing certain possibilities. Persons
have a natural attunement to the world which allows them to form
constructs which order their fields of action. 37 These constructs are
the ground for reflective interpretation of action. Thus, interpreta
tion of human action proceeds upon a preinterpreted field of ac
tion, preinterpreted by both the actor and the analyst. Thus, any
action has to be understood as the actor understood it. A situation
has to be perceived in terms of the constructs of the actor: his mo
tivations, goals and fears. The actor has preinterpreted the action
of the other by typifying the motives, goals and attitudes of others.
The act of others in "this" situation is but an instance of that typifi
cation. 38 What is taken as typical is determined by the situation,
the problem-at-hand as Alfred Schutz terms it. 39
Thus, to make a judgment upon anyone's action in a particular
case, for example, formation of a contract, fraud or murder, re
quires the judge to understand the actor's subjective interpre
tation of his situtation. The actor imbues the action with meaning;
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89A, Comment b, at 198 (Tent.
Draft nos. 1-7, 1973).
35. Id. Comment d, at 199.
36. Schutz, Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences, in EXISTEN
TIAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY 96 (H.Y. Jung ed. 1972).
37. Id. at 98.
38. Id. at 100.
39. Id. at 99.
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to determine intent, to determine responsibility or to determine
state of mind requires the judge to determine, first, the actor's
meaning.
(In Webb,40 for example, the problem-at-hand, the litigation,
defined for the construct that which was typical and that which was
unique. Webb and McGowin imbued their actions and relationship
with a certain meaning which became critical for resolution of the
case. In determining this meaning, the judge can construct models
of typical action upon the alternative construction advanced by the
parties. He then can vary the situation to test action in the case
against his model. The action of continuing payment throughout
McGowin's life is consistent, given the facts of the case, only with
typified action in a situation of recognition of benefit received and
obligation incurred. Had McGowin not continued payment, that
action could be' seen as being inconsistent with the construct. It is
in their actions that their understanding of the situation and their
actions lie. 41
This is not to say that the actor's meaning is determinative of
the legal issue, but it is of critical importance. The perspective of
each party and of other witnesses must be considered. 42 A legal
decision is a founded construct. It is a construct formed upon a
prior construct. One can form such a construct and one can under
stand the interpretation of the actor because the knowledge of the
world upon which these constructs are found is rooted in a primor
dial commonality of existence and knowledge.
We are born into and share a common world; sociality charac
terizes the fundamental content which gives shape and meaning to
our lives and the understanding of our lives. Knowledge is social,
and it is grounded in this shared epistemological and experiential
background. 43 It is agai~st this background, generally nonthematic,
40. 232 Ala. at 374, 168 So. at 199.
41. This same kind of construct formation is evident, perhaps most clearly, in
"reasonable person" standards.
42. For example, one of the major problems of evidence is the reconciliation of
the subjective interpretations of the situations by each party, and by nonparty wit
nesses.
43. Schutz, supra note 36, at 101. Schutz says that knowledge is socialized in at
least three respects: (1) It is structurally socialized through an idealization of a reci
procity of perspectives which assumes that each of us would experience a situation
the same as another i( we were to change places; (2) it is genetically socialized in
that much of our knowledge is socially desired, as in socially approved terms; and (3)
there is a social distribution of knowledge. ld. No one knows all of the world, and
knowledge of anyone part varies in degree with individuals.
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that decisions are made and other action is taken. This common
sense orientation to the world, to others and our relationships to
them, makes community possible. Legal decisions, as other forms
of action, receive direction and sense from this backlog of common
sense understanding of the world. A judge comes to his decision
with a common sense, nonthematic acceptance of the nature of the
world, and the relationships of men within his society. Factual pat
terns emerging from or isolated against this background in the form
of a legal dispute, carry with them an atmosphere of familiarity and
sociality which orients the judge, which predisposes him toward a
particular reading of those facts. Again, those facts which will be
seen as typical and those as unique depend upon the problem at
hand. In other words, if a judge is deciding a case in terms of lack
of consideration, his perspective of the case will be different than if
he must decide if certain conditions are precedent I'or promissory. '
Because cases' come to court against a background of familiarity and
with a certain preattunement to the social word, the judge can deal
with them within a framework of typification of the common sense
constructs he forms of the world. This explains better than any rea
son why like cases are and should be treated alike. It is this pri
mordial familiarity or sociality which accounts for different results
in factually different cases; it is the reason why a court chooses, in
an existential sense, to view cases and facts differently. Because the
structures of our existence are not rigid, we can and do see and
experience events differently, but generally within a range of ac
ceptable variation. Outside this range, perception is eccentric or
aberrant.
In cases of moral obligation such' as Webb 44 and HaTTington, 45
the typification 46 of the relationship of the parties, in terms of the
courts' common sense understanding of these' kinds of relationships,
clothes that relationship with a particular status which directs the
court toward its conclusion. In Webb,47 the plaintiff Webb was car
rying out his work duties when he found himself in the position of
possibly harming McGowin. His relation to McGowin was up to
that point non personal. He was permanently crippled as a result of
saving McGowin's life. McGowin planned to pay a specific amount
44.
45,
46.
47.
supra.

232 Ala. at 374, 168 So. at 199.
225 N.C. at 690,36 S.E.2d at 227.
Schutz, supra note 36, at 101.
232 Ala. at 374, 168 So. at 199. See also text accompanying notes 26 & 27
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for a specific period of time. Payments were made without any re
pudiation beginning approximately one month after the accident.
This action by McGowin induced a justifiable expectation, and pos
sible reliance by Webb, and it appears that McGowin intended this
result.
McGowin intentionally created a new relationship between
himself and Webb based upon his recognition of a moral debt that
he owed to Webb. The action was taken with some deliberation,
thereby reducing the threat of an emotional, spontaneous expres
sion of gratitude lacking sober thought as to McGowin's ability to
make the payments and his intent to do so. He purposely initiated
a relationship in which expectation of and reliance on the payments
was induced. This relationship had existed for several years, and a
relational balance existed. To deny enforcement of the promise
would destroy this balance. An interesting question is whether the
court would have enforced the promise had only one payment
been made and then McGowin repudiated. What seems crucial
here, however, is how the parties looked at their relationship.
Again, the subjective understanding of the actor is vital for an ob
server's analysis of the act. It is to this subjectivity that the court
looks to resolve the dispute, and it is by this subjectivity and by
the court's subjectivity that an understanding of legal decisions is
generated.
In Harrington, 48 by contrast, the relationship is significantly
different. The plaintiff involved herself in an apparently violent sit
uation prior to the actual injurious actions. She had a direct and
personal relation to the defendant. The defendant's promise to pay
was emotionally spontaneous and nonspecific. He promised to pay
for her "damages." Whether he meant medical bills only, or loss of
use of her hand in addition, is undetermined. He apparently repu
diated any continuing obligation after a small payment. The degree
or permanence of injury to plaintiff is not stated.
It is questionable whether the defendant intentionally created
a new relationship between the parties which induced justifiable
expectation and reliance by plaintiff. The defendant did not per
ceive the relationship as obligatory nor long-lasting. There is no ev
idence of sober reflection by the defendant in terms of his position,
both financially and personally, in regard to such an undertaking.
Consequently, no continuing relationship of reliance and expecta
48.

supra.

225 N.C. at 690, 36 S.E.2d at 227. See also text accompanying notes 28 & 29
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tion was established between the parties. Thrusting a jural relation
ship on these parties under these facts may well have created a re
lational imbalance. Whether one agrees that such an imbalance
would have resulted is not relevant at this point. It is relevant that
it seems the court may have so perceived that result. Had the de
fendant made payments for a longer period of time, for example,
for two years, then a different relationship may well have been cre
ated and a relational balance established which the court would
have to consider in resolving the case.
Each of the factors discussed are drawn from the facts, but
conveys an atmosphere which combines to construct a status, a
typification of the event which is understandable and not unfamil
iar. The motives and intentions of the parties thereby become ob
jectively available for consideration by the court in its resolution.
Through typification, the event takes its place in our world. It re
tains its uniqueness but is not alien. The fact that it came about is
not unique, but the way it came about is unique. Understanding
the event is subjective, as one must grasp the way the actor under
stood both thematically and nonthematically, this act, but it is also
objective in terms of the typification of the event for judicial reso
lution. The effect of typification is to allow the event to be ab
stracted. It is classified, and thus makes possible the application of
general principles. In this way, cases which are classified as similar
through typification can be treated in accordance with the same
principles. Like cases are treated alike. It is in the intersubjectivity
of our shared world, however, that the existential choice is made as
to the ultimate resolution of the difficult case. As indicated above,
many, if not most, cases do not receive extended judicial consider
ation. Such cases fall into clearly recognizable classifications based
upon previous judicial and legislative action of the kind discussed.
It follows that legal theory begins at the level of judicial typifica
tion. Here subjectivity and objectivity come together to form the
structure of the social institution called law.
It is unnecessary for present purposes to analyze each area of
consideration. The ones discussed have served to sketch the line of
analysis to be followed. Considerations of relational halance derived
from the typification of the individual event determine the judicial
decision. In each of the cases discussed, it appears that courts
move to create or to maintain a relational balance between the par
ties. This may be achieved either through enforcement or non
enforcement of a contract and consideration either is or is not pres
ent in formal terms. To state it differently, the term consideration
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was used affirmatively to move the parties into or out of a jural re
lationship in order to achieve a relational balance between them
within the limits of the existing social relations. This view of courts'
use of consideration eliminates the apparent problem, in theory, of
enforcing contracts without consideration such as those that con
cern moral consideration or past consideration. When consideration
is understood as signaling a system of dispute resolution in which
relational balance is the essential factor in the decision regarding
enforceability, and consideration is seen as a mode of expression
regarding that balance, then no need exists to attempt to impose a
symmetry through fictions or exceptions to the general rule. Yet,
what is the ground of that determination? What determines when a
relationship is so skewed, so imbalanced as to require nonen
forcement, or when the balance is sufficient for enforcement? Con
siderations of minimal equality form that ground. Before
explicating that ground, however, it is necessary to analyze
unconscionability to see if that term also leads to minimal equality
as the ground of contracts. If so, then it will be appropriate to dis
cuss contract adjudication in terms of minimal equality.
UNCONSCIONABILITY

Much has been written about unconscionability as it relates to
contract law, especially since the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) set forth unconscionability as a ground for partial or total
nonenforcement. 49 Following the method of analysis used in the
previous section, the ground of. unconscionability can be revealed
through description of the te~m' s linguistic and existential nature in
a way which is both constructive and instructive.
Initially, two positions may be noted which establish the stage
for dialogue about unconscionability. 50 The first is that of Professor
Arthur Allen Leff;51 the second, that of Professor M.P. Elling
haus. 52 Leff objects to the code provision because he feels that
"unconscionability" has no "reality referent. "53 Therefore, the term
is meaningless and merely allows judges to use their own notions
49. U.C.C. § 2-302.
50. Hereinafter, legal unconscionability will be used only with reference to
§ 2-302.
51. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, U5 U.
PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
52. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L. J. 757 (1969).
53. See note 51 supra at 558. Though only explicitly stated in the conclusion,
this appears to be the basis of his dissatisfaction.
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of fairness to overturn or to modify a contract. One can only take
Leff's criticism to be based upon a label theory of language, as
earlier discussed. 54 Thus, because there is no thing, no objective
reality, to which unconscionability refers, it has no meaning. True,
unconscionability is unlike words, such as tree or rock, which label
tangible objects. The region of discourse in which the terms are
used are different.
Unconscionability is used in discourse of and about human ac
tion which, as was earlier discussed, 55 involves primarily the sig
naling and quasi-performative uses of speech. Therefore, one
should not and cannot expect "reality referents" in the sense Leff
seems to desire. When one uses the term "unconscionability," one
is concerned with the quality of a human relationship; when sec
tion 2-302 of the U.C.C. is involved, one is concerned with a con
tractual relationship which is a particular kind of human relation
ship. Initially, the use of unconscionability signals the existence of
a social-moral field of action which is delineated by an inherited
tradition or vocabulary of moral precepts. This vocabulary of moral
precepts constitutes a moral framework within which interpersonal
dealings must remain.
Unconscionable is used in ordinary language to describe action
which is excessive, outrageous, or contrary to moral propriety, for
example, the unconscionability of poverty in an affluent society,
the unconscionability of forced sterilization and the unconscion
ability of the use of war for political or economic gains. In each of
these situations, the speaker is making a moral judgment which is a
judgment delineated by the linguistic history of the terms used. To
use the term "unconscionable" is to make a moral judgment. Its
use moves the parties into a particular relationship; a certain atti
tude is assumed by the speaker toward the other party or the ac
tion, and certain kinds of consequences are sought. This linguistic
entourage accompanies every use of the term.
"Unconscionability" comes to its use in section 2-302 with a
history constructed out of familiar and acceptable ways of treating
others. Our moral vocabulary distinguishes for us the trivial from
the serious breaches of conduct. For example, if one betrays a
trust, one's action may be indiscreet, an abuse of trust or uncon
scionable, depending on the nature of the trust and of the action.
The question arises as to what point action ceases being indiscreet
54. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
55. See notes 5 & 6 supra and accompanying text.
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and becomes an abuse of trust, or ceases being an abuse of trust
and becomes unconscionable. Obviously, there is no precise divid
ing line. There are areas of overlap, yet we use the words compe
tently and confidently. There are cases which are not clearly one or
the other; some action may be indiscreet or an abuse of trust, but
not indiscreet or unconscionable. That jump is too great. Our lan
guage restricts us in our judgments.
This same progression exists in contracts, especially in going
from a hard bargain to an unconscionable one. There are clear
cases of both with an area of overlap in which other policy factors
may be determinative. But this is no different than many other
areas of law such as due process, equal protection, or "unfair meth
ods of competition" in the Federal Trade Commission Act. 56 Each
phrase takes on meaning within a particular field of relevance. 57
When dealing in each field, the judge through typification selec
tively attends to factors historically, grammatically58 and legally rel
evant to the application of the standard. Each field is built upon a
certain orientation and certain facts and grouping of facts which are
unquestioned. They form the background against which the partic
ular problem will be viewed and the decision reached.
Unconscionability signals a social-moral field of action which
establishes a construct of contractual morality. Initially, this con
struct appears to be a counterpoint to another fundamental contrac
tual construct, freedom of contract. Finding the most eloquent jus
tification in the writings of men like Adam Smith, Jeremy Bent
hem, and John Stuart Mill,59 freedom of contract came to be
equated with the free market system of capitalism. 60 Simultane
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1976).
57. See A. SCHUTZ, ON PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS 111-12 (H.
R. Wagner ed. 1970). For an expanded treatment of this notion see A. SCHUTZ, THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD (G. Walsh & F. Lehnert trans. 1967).
58. Grammar is being used here in the Wittgensteinian sense. See L. WITTGEN
STEIN, supra note 2. Pitkin notes that grammar, "includes all the various verbal ex
pressions in which that word is characteristically used." H. PITKIN, supra note 3, at
117. But she goes on to indicate that Wittgenstein is attempting to suggest a relation
ship between grammar and the world. Grammar tells us what we call a particular
"set of phenomena in the world." Id. at 118 (citing S. Cavell, The Claim to Rational
ity 131 (1961-62) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University)). She con
tinues, grammar "specifies not merely the expressions in which a word is character
istically used, but also ... what counts as an application of 'those expressions.' " Id.
at 118.
59. See Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L. Q. 365 (1921).
60. See Kessler, Contract as a Principle of Order, in READINGS IN JURISPRU
DENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 140-46 (M. Cohen & F. Cohen eds. 1951).
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ously drawing upon individualistic philosophy with its concept of
the autonomous will, and the "invisible hand"61 of Adam Smith,
philosophers and jurists conceived of a contract as the freely
formed agreement of autonomous individuals which provided the
surest guarantee of economic and social progress.
Yet, there has always been what Friedrich Kessler calls coun
tercurrent6 2 in contract law which injects an element of moral
ity or fairness into contract adjudication. Kessler points to the use
of consideration as evidence of this phenomenon. Constructive
fraud and promissory conditions are other examples. It is from this
countercurrent that unconscionability receives its direction. The
use of unconscionability in legal discourse signals this countercur
rent of moral discourse in contract adjudication. This moral con
struct signaled by unconscionability and the construct of freedom of
contract for the nonthematic background against which courts must
decide the question of contract unconscionability. In fact, the
grammar of the term "freedom" includes the sense of interpersonal
dealings which accredit the commonality of people and the need
for each person to be allowed to achieve his potential. This is be
cause of the interdependent nature of our possibilities. 63
It is because of this grammatical inheritance that Professor
M. P. Ellinghaus' description of unconscionability as a residual cate
gory term is misleading. 64 In his attempt to define unconscion
ability as a viable legal tool, Ellinghaus concedes too much to
Left" s charge of debilitating vagueness. Ellinghaus resigns
unconscionability to a residual category in order to salvage its use
fulness. He admits that its content may be illusory and then pro
ceeds to justify this illusoriness. 65 Such a defense can be required
only if one proceeds, as Ellinghaus apparently does, from a label
theory of language: unconscionability is a thing to be filled up with
definite meaning. When one sees unconscionability performatively
as a term to be used to do certain things, to bring about certain re
sults, then such a defense is seen as being erroneously based, just
as the position against which it is defending. Residual category con
notes a usage which is akin to a repository of illusory concepts to
61. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (1937).
62. See Kessler, supra note 60, at 143; F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS
37 (2d ed. 1970).
63. See generally M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME § 58, at 325 (H. Macquarrie
& E. Robinson trans. 1962).
64. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L. J. 757 (1969).
65. Id. at 760.
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which resort is had when more precise tools are unavailable. Sup
posedly, this would contrast with a normal precision in legal gram
mar, but that is a precision which seldom exists.
Needs of new situations may require extensions, or additions
to the legal grammar of unconscio_nability, but although such use
may be a deformation, it is a coherent deformation 66 in the gram
mar. This is the same manner in which case law has grown in all
areas. For example, the grammar of the legal term "defamation,"
moved from direct assault upon one's character67 to innuendo
which may disrupt one's social intercourse68 through the same
process of coherent deformation. Defamation has no more of a real
ity referent than does unconscionability and is no more residual in
its meaning. There is nothing empty which needs to be filled in ei
ther case, but only new situations which require creative applica
tion and perhaps addition of new characteristics to the existing con
ceptual family.69 Each time, however, the new adjudication is
performed against a background which guides and limits the use of
the term. The grammar of the term carries with it its own field of
application.
What happens when the term is used and what is the quasi
performative function? Naturally, when one uses that term with
reference to or as descriptive of a contractual relationship, one has
expressed an attitudinal posture toward the relationship in terms
of, or against the background of, the social-moral field of action and
the included construct of contractual morality. When a judge says a
contract is unconscionable, he is moving the level of discourse from
a political-legal to a moral-legal field. The legal perspective of the
contractual relationship has changed and the jural consequences of
that relationship are different. The judge is no longer looking for a
bargain to enforce, or to determine damages for breach. He is now
thinking in remedial terms in favor of the weaker party. It is this

66. This idea of coherent deformation in expanding uses of language is bor
rowed from Maurice Merleau-Ponty. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS 68 (R. McCleary
trans. 1964).
67. Smale v. Hammon, 80 Eng. Rep. 743 (K.B. 1610).
68. Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733 (2d .Cir. 1945), cen. denied,
326 U.S. 979 (1946).
69. See L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 2, § 67, at 32. Wittgenstein develops the
notion of family resemblances to describe the grammar of a word. The word, any
word, is used in various instances to perform certain functions, to say certain things,
for example, the word "games." Compare chess, solitaire, football and children's
games. They are not identical and there is no one definition of game; but they all
share certain resemblances, like family members.
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movement in the nature of the discourse, and the creation of a dif
ferent kind of jural relationship, which is effected by the courts'
use of the term "unconscionable."
This change in the nature of the discourse also occurs when
the court states that it or a lower court must review the relation
ship to see if it is unconscionable. This may result from the court's
own initiative, or more likely, from an attorney's argument. When
the latter chooses to argue unconscionability, he is attempting to
create a particular kind of relationship, to take a certain view of the
case and to discuss the case in different terms. The attorney's deci
sion to argue unconscionability is an attempt to control the nature
of the ensuing legal discourse; he seeks to argue more in terms of
contractual morality than in the technical legal vocabulary relating
to formation of contract. It is this move in the nature of the dis
course which is performed when one uses the term "uncon
scionability." U nconscionabili ty is used in discourse of and about
human action, and it involves a judgment about the quality of a hu
man relationship. Thus, its use by a court directs one to the quality
of the relationship existing between the parties in dispute, and
does so in terms of a moral evaluation of that relationship. A few
cases will demonstrate this point.
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture CO.70 involved a condi
tional sales agreement which required all installment payments to
be applied pro rata to all "outstanding leases, bills and ac
counts. "71 The effect of this provision was to maintain a balance
due on each item purchased until the balance due on all items was
paid. Thus, each item became security for all others. In this case, a
default on a stereo set purchased in 1962 triggered an attempt to
replevy all items purchased since 1957. The court reversed a hold
ing for the furniture company and remanded for further findings on
the possible unconscionability of the contract. 72 The trial court had
made no such findings, contending it had no grounds upon which
to refuse enforcement. 73 The appellate court read the then recent
enactment of the U.C.C. by Congress as persuasive authority for
following the common law cases which developed the uncon
scionability doctrine codified in section 2-302.74
70. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. CiT. 1965).
71. [d. at 447. The lease language referred to purchase of goods treated as
leases until full payment, at which time title would pass from the company to the
purchaser.
72. [d. at 450.
73. [d. at 448.
74. [d. at 449.
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Recalling the earlier point that unconscionability involves the
evaluation of a human relationship, this case can be analyzed in re
lational terms to understand what factors determined the court's
conclusion. Contracts involve the voluntary agreement by one
party to perform certain acts for a return agreement to perform
certain other acts: obligations voluntarily assumed in return for a
desired performance. Here, as in cases of consideration, the rela
tional balance existing in the agreement is determinative. The court
prefers nonenforcement because the company dominated the rela
tionship in a degree disproportionate to the obligations it had
incurred. Had the company sought only to replevy the stereo set
purchased in 1962, the court most likely would have enforced the
contract. Such action by the company would have been commensu
rate with the obligation existing on both sides. But to maintain a
security interest in items purchased five years earlier through the
pro rata application of all payments evidences a commercial en
slavement of the consumer. The company extended credit to a con
sumer who it knew or should have known could not afford the
items purchased. 75 The possibility existed that the company could
receive some payment for the stereo, then upon default, replevy it
plus all other items purchased, and derive a profit from their ulti
mate resale because of the interest and principal already received.
The court remanded and directed the lower court to analyze
the parties' relationship in terms of the relative ability of the par
ties to understand the terms of the contract and to bargain for the
terms, and also to determine the relative balance in the obligations
incurred and consideration received. 76 The critical question was
whether the consumer was capable of an informed and voluntary
choice in entering the contract, or had the contract been imposed
on him because of his lack of understanding or economic bar
gaining power. If the latter is the case, the resulting relational
imbalance would move the court toward nonenforcement. Freedom
of contract has to be subordinated to contractual morality in such
circumstances. As the court states: "In such a case the usual rule
that the terms of the agreement are not to be questioned should be
75. Id. at 448. The court noted that the contract listed the name of the consum
er's social worker and the amount of her welfare check, $218 per month. The stereo
set cost $514. Id.
76. Id. at 449-50. The court listed as relevant; whether the contract terms un
reasonably favored one party; the comparative education or lack of education of the
parties; the location of the terms in the contract; the relative bargaining power of the
parties. Id.
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abandoned and the court should consider whether the terms of the
contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld. "77
Similarly, in Jones v. Star Credit COrp.,78 the court stated
that section 2-302 enacts the moral sense of the community into
the law of commercial transactions. 79 The primary issue in the case
was whether in the attendant circumstances the price term of a
contract was unconscionable. The plaintiffs purchased a freezer for
$900 plus financing charges which was shown to be worth $300.
The seller knew that the consumers were welfare recipients. As
welfare recipients, the consumers had limited financial resources,
yet the seller sold them a freezer at three times its actual value.
The seller had a gross inequality of bargaining power from which
the court could infer an absence of meaningful choice by the con
sumers.80 The court discusses the quality of a contractual relation
ship and subordinates the notion of absolute freedom to contract to
that of contractual morality.
Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 81 which denied
a claim of unconscionability, further illustrates the point. Athough
the seller received a profit of over 100% on the sale of household
effects, exclusive of financing charges, the court found the factors
of voluntariness and choice were present to the degree that the re
sulting imbalance had not been imposed. 82 The buyer had been
free to participate in comparison shopping. Here, freedom of con
tract did not produce a result intolerable to the underlying moral
ity of contractual relationships. This was a hard bargain, perhaps
unfair to a degree, but there was not such an inequality in the par
ties' relational status to justify nonenforcement.
This same analysis applies when the bargaining positions of the
parties were relatively equal, but certain terms of the agreement
skew the parties' relational balance. There are only a few of these
cases. 83 One example is United States Leasing Corp. v. Franklin

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

ld.
59 Misc. 2d 189,298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
ld. at 191,298 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
ld. at 192,298 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
280 A.2d 775 (D.C.' 1971).
82. ld. at 776.
83. Such a case would generally be in a commercial setting and,the courts are
reluctant to accept a claim of unconscionability here because of the relatively equal
power and knowledge of the parties. See generally J. D. Pavlak, Ltd. v. William
Davies Co., 46 Ill. App. 3d 1,351 N.E.2d 243 (1976); S. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNI
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-2, at 113, § 12-11, at 383 (1972).
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Plaza Apartments, Inc., 84 which involved a lease-purchase arrange
ment which was treated by the court as a contract for the sale of
goods, an address printing machine. The name plates for use in the
printer were never delivered, and thus, the machine was useless.
The defendant refused to pay and the plaintiff sued for the price.
Although the defendant had negotiated with Pitney-Bowes, Inc.,
the lease denoted the plaintiff as lessor and Pitney-Bowes as sup
plier. Defendant had never dealt with the plaintiff during nego
tiations. 85
The terms of the contract disclaimed on behalf of the plaintiff
all warranties, express or implied, and any responsibility for instal
lation or operation of the printer. The plaintiff assigned all rights it
had under warranties given it by the supplier to the defendant.
This was held to be illusory because it was not shown that any such
warranties had been given. The purpose of these provisions was
summarized by the court as being the desire to disassociate de
fenses and to isolate payment from any warranties given defendant
by Pitney-Bowes. 86 Because it would be inequitable to compel pay
ment for equipment which could not be used, while denying the
defendant the right to interpose any defenses, the court found the
terms to be unconscionable. 87
Although the relationship of the parties was relatively equal
during the transformational stage, the substantive terms of the con
tract destroyed that equality. To enforce those provisions would
permit a type of commercial domination contrary both to our com
mon sense of fairness and to business needs and mores. The obliga
tions imposed on the defendant greatly outweighed any benefit re
ceived. He has to pay to a party with whom he did not deal the
full price of goods he cannot use, in return for a right to sue the
party with whom he did deal and who has refused to de.liver con
forming goods. This isolation of right to price from responsibility
for warranties and other contractual obligations undermined the re
lational equality necessary for the proper functioning of contractual
relationships.
84.
85.

65 Misc. 2d 1082,319 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971).
[d. at 1083, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
86. Id. at 1087, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 536. Such an arrangement is familiar in the con
sumer context where an assignee of a retail sales agreement attempts to deflect any
claims the consumer has with regard to the product to the original retailer while de
manding payment from the consumer. Such clauses have been held to be uncon
scionable. Star Credit Corp. v. Molina, 59 Misc. 2d 290, 298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. 1969).
87. 65 Misc. 2d at 1086, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
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The relational imbalance which is present in cases of uncon
scionability grossly distorts the assumptions embedded in the doc
trine of freedom of contract. This distortion produces the social
political counterpoint to freedom of contract. A contractual rela
tionship requires a relational balance stemming either from
substantive fairness or fairness in the formation of the relationship.
In using unconscionability to describe a contract, the court is say
ing that the transformation of the social into the contractual rela
tionship, either in the manner of that transformation or in the
terms of the relationship, has resulted in a relational imbalance
which is intolerable when measured against the construct of con
tractual morality which forms the jural background of such relation
ships.
The cited cases are rather typical of the kind of analysis courts
use to determine questions of unconscionability. A review of the
cases reveals that courts focus on certain factors in determining this
issue. As seen, the factors include voluntariness, equality of bar
gaining power, meaningful choice, educational and financial status
of the parties and the obligations incurred in return for the consid
eration received. These factors give shape to the phenomenon of
unconscionability, and the review of the speech situations in which
the term is used reveals the term's grammar which serves to isolate
the phenomenon for further study.
These terms all go to the relational status of the parties and
the relational balance in the contract. In comparison to the favored
party, the issue is whether the other party entered the relationship
without coercion or imposition. The court considers whether the
party made the decision to enter from a position in which he both
understood the nature of the relationship and had the ability to
have his interests considered with the same weight as the other
party's interests. Ability includes financial, educational and social
factors. Finally, court's look to whether the relational balance is so
distorted in terms of the obligations the party has incurred as com
pared to the consideration he has given or received as to justify the
inference of a negative answer to the above questions. These fac
tors describe a relational phenomenon in which one party has such
a superior position or advantage as to destroy the sense of agree
ment which underlies contract, and to substitute a sense of domi
nation.
When one considers the notions of stronger-weaker, superior
inferior, choice-no choice, obligation without adequate reciprocity,
and relational balance versus imbalance, one is lead inevitably to
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the notion of equality. The term does not mean identity, but does
signal a range within which such relationships should be confined.
Equality tends to set only a minimal standard. To state it differ
ently, the legal discourse of unconscionability seems to describe a
contractual relationship in which the relational imbalance has be
come so skewed as to eliminate a minimal equality in the relation
of the parties. It is when the imbalance reaches this point that a
court moves to nonenforcement of the particular contract or
provision.
An unconscionable contract is distinguished from a hard bar
gain, a bad bargain and an unfair bargain. Some degree of unfair
ness or harshness is tolerable, though not commendable. Here, as
with consideration, the question is what amount of unfairness is too
much. As with consideration, relational balance is sought and the
amount of imbalance required necessitates an analysis of the con
cept of equality. We have seen that inequality as such is insuffi
cient for court interference. It has also become clear, however,
that some equality is necessary. The cases appear to delineate a
sense of minimal equality which is necessary for a contractual rela
tionship to receive judicial approval. Contractual morality limits
freedom of contract and does so by requiring minimal equality in
the relationship. An analysis of such language as voluntariness,
meaningful choice, equality of bargaining power, and balance in
consideration given and received, reveals that in legal discourse
they all are grammatically related to equality. They are all used to
evaluate the quality of a relationship and do so in terms of the
equality of the relational status of the parties. None require abso
lute equality, but all require a minimal equality. What then is the
meaning, or the use, of the phrase "minimal equality in legal
discourse ?"
One final caveat, in keeping with the original intent of this ar
ticle. There has not been an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness
of unconscionability as a legal tool, nor to speculate on its future
applications. This article merely attempts to disclose the sense of
the concept as used in legal discourse.
MINIMAL EQUALITY

This section 88 explicates the ground of contract adjudication as
88. Though originally developed for this article, the analysis in this section was
first presented in condensed fonn in a paper presented to a symposium sponsored by
the Ohio Program in the Humanities on Quality Integrated Education, in Akron,
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developed from the foregoing analysis of consideration and un
conscionability. The discussion of each of these phenomena leads to
the single theme of minimal equality. It was this felt need for
equality which inwardly, and perhaps not always cognitively, led
the court to a decision of enforcement or nonenforcement. Law is a
relational phenomenon, and it was seen that an analysis of the ap
plication of legal principles in terms of the relational balance
between the adversary parties served to expose the existential
grounds for the decisions. These grounds are bound up with the
lived understanding of the judges, their familiarity with social phe
nomena and the ability to form typifications based on that subjec
tive experience. The ability to typify individual social phenomena
enables the judge to apply general legal principles to concrete
cases in a coherent, consistent fashion. The process is rational be
cause it defines an identifiable, coherent region of discourse, a par
ticular orientation toward human problems which specifies the
manner of resolution. That which characterizes this region or orien
tation is its imposition of a typification and a particular construct of
relevancies 89 onto the parties in dispute. This imposed typification
constitutes a requirement of a minimal equality between the par
ties in their relationship to the law as to those elements or traits
which are relevant in determining that equality.
The term "equality" is used in several different speech situa
tions such as in political or scientific discourse. Within each region
of discourse the term is used to do different things. The context in
which the term is used and the point of the discourse determines
the concrete meaning of the term. Each region requires a typifica
tion of the situations and problems which arise or have to be re
solved within that region. 90 Thus, the purpose for creating the typ
ification is crucial in attempting to understand the concept; and it
follows that the relevant traits in determining what we mean by
equality are those traits relevant to the resolution of that problem.
The sense of minimal equality must be constructed from a descrip
tion of the speech situations which determine its use.
Ohio, October 7, 1977. The paper, reprinted by permission, applied the present anal
ysis to the fourteenth amendment.
89. See Schutz, Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World, in
ASPECTS OF HUMAN EQUALITY 33, 65 (Conference on Science, Philosophy and Reli
gion No. 15, 1955) (L. Bryson, L. Faust, L. Finkelstein & R. Maciver eds. 1956).
90. The need to analyze typifications in terms of the purpose for their creation
and the need to discuss equality in terms of homogeneous sets of typifications is as
developed by Schutz, and used in his essay on equality. Id.
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In logical systems, equality is used to indicate an identity be
tween two propositions. Since such discourse is not about human
action, it is not relevant to present purposes except as it yields a
part of the grammar of equality or equivalence.
,
Political discourse is more fruitful since it is human action and
it is precisely human action that is involved in the legal discourse
of contract law. Equality is used in political discourse initially to
create and to impose a certain typification onto society. That typifi
cation, or political paradigm, involves an inherent orientation to
ward the community by government which focuses on the com
monality of man rather than on his individuality. This is done to
create a political structure within which each individual can express
his talents most fully and pursue his interests most effectively by
removing the legitimization of a politically created disadvantage of
one with reference to another. The paradigm determines that only
those traits which relate to formal inclusion within the political sys
tem are relevant in determining the basic citizen-state
relationship.
The Greek pOliS 91 exemplifies this situation. Once a determi
nation had been made relative to inclusion, then the government
recognized no differentiation between the members in terms of
their relationship to each other and to the state. Equality was used
only in political discourse of and about the polis. Those outside
the polis had a different relationship, not an unequal one. Inequality
would be manifest only if the governmental body treated a mem
ber of the polis either in a more advantageous or disadvantageous
manner. Similarly, citizens of the United .States are treated equally
by the state while non-citizens can be treated differently, vis-a-vis
citizens, but that is not unequal treatment. Since equality and ine
quality are relational notions, they can be used consistently only
within homogeneous groups. 92

91. A Greek city-state, in its ideal fonn as a community, embodies the organiza
tion and fulfillment of man's social relations.
92. Schutz, supra note 89, at 46. Our political system does treat citizens and
noncitizens in the same way in certain cases, for example, contracts with noncitizens.
In such cases, they are treated "as citizens" for purposes of the case. In those in
stances, they are part of the citizen group and political equality applies to the court's
actions. Discriminations which recognize differing and legitimate needs of classes of
citizens, such as welfare payments or veterans benefits, do not· disrupt the basic
citizen-state relationship as they do not create any political inequality in govemmen-.
tal treatment of citizens. All people who bring themselves within these classifica
tions are treated equally, and no one is precluded from demonstrating eligibility for
inclusion in the classes.
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One uses the term "equality" in political discourse to create or
to attempt to create a particular kind of relationship in a particular
situation by concretizing the general notion embodied in the para
digm. Thus, to say that the government cannot treat a person dis
advantageously because of his color or sex is an attempt to concret
ize the abstract notion of equality and to create a relationship and
impose consequences of a particular kind in that situation. The
questions of whether equality is good or bad, practical or not, and
of the proper criteria for structuring the group, are all different
questions. The point is that the term "equality" is used with refer
ence to relations within homogeneous groups and signals an im
posed typification, the purpose of which is to promote the realiza
tion of the potential of the individual members by emphasizing
their commonality in terms of an identity of interests in a political
community.
Equality is also used in discourse about social status. Here,
several subsets of discourse can be involved, such as individual
equality, equality in terms of acquisitions and economic equality.
Individual equality may mean, for example, discussion of relative
physical or intellectual abilities. Acquisition refers to such factors as
education, developed skills and experience. Economic equality may
involve the relative amount of wealth, broadly defined as financial
credit potential, at the party's disposal in pursuing his needs and in
terests. Equality, as used here, seems to assume a range of equiva
lence within which people would be called equal; it does not re
quire an identical matching of ability of acquisitions. In social
discourse, as in other regions, the point of the discussion deter
mines the scheme of relevancies to be applied. If one is discussing
athletic potential, economic advantages are irrelevant. If one is dis
cussing educational and intellectual potential, physical size or per
sonal wealth are irrelevant. Social equality, however, stresses the
individuality of peop\e as opposed to their commonality.
One often discusses social equality in judgmental terms. It is
an evaluation of the ability or effectiveness of a government to
meet the needs of the citizens. Also, one may attempt to create
new relationships with the state by discussing the social inequali
ties of the community. Such discourse focuses on equality in the
sense of acquired and economic status. This is an attempt to trans
form social discourse into political discourse by relating social ine
quality to political action. The reason why the question of equality
is posed determines the relevant elements and the regions of con
cern. The question presupposes a background against which it is
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used, a background created by decisions or orientations premised
upon other grounds, for example, moral grounds involving whether
social equality is good or necessary for human happiness.
The political orientation toward commonality, and the social
orientation toward individuality, is a manifestation of certain exis
tential structures of the living world. 93 At the first awareness, man
is already in the world, already involved with others, already a
member of a community, such as the family, tribe or state. One's
first awareness is not of individuation but of commonality,94 and it
is only with maturation that individuation occurs. Each of one's
personal projects is comprised of possibilities for action which re
late to and are to some extent determined by the possibilities of
others. One's potentiality is then dependent upon the actions of
others, and vice versa. Thus, the realization of individual potential
ity is inextricably related to other's realization of one's potential.
This is part of the human situation into which we are born. One
learns of oneself, his situation through others, and they through
him. 95 We share a world, the meaning of which has its locus in
intersubjectivity. Part of the existential situation of man is this pri
mordial commonality from which man's projects are launched, and
which orients him toward an understanding of his existence.
Denying this commonality and accepting only individuation fails to
accredit part of man's nature.
Even given this commonality, however, one is set off against
others to some extent. One knows oneself in a different way then
one knows others or other things. For example, the question "Is
this my hand?" is nonsense without a very rare context. Can one
prove it is his hand? No, the question is nonsense. This tacit
knowledge 96 one has of oneself, if it can indeed be called knowl
edge, testifies to one's individuation. One's history, though em
bedded in a shared world and a shared history, is still somehow
93. The following discussion, while not drawn directly from anyone section, is
derived in its basic theory from Martin Heidegger. See M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND
TIME 0. Macquarries & E. Robinson trans. 1962) (one of the most thorough descrip
tions of the existential structures of the life world).
94. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE ACQUISITION OF LAN
GUAGE (H. Silverman trans. 1973). Merleau-Ponty sees consciousness of self as being
a function of language, which is an intersubjective phenomenon. See also MERLEAU
PONTY, supra note 8.
95. This is not the place to restate the fullness of Heidegger's description. See
generally note 93 supra, at 149.
96. See, e.g., L. WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 2 (D. Paul & G. Anscombe
trans. 1969).
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one's own and somewhat different than others. One relates to oth
ers in a variety of ways, such as love, hate and indifference, but
can do so on an individual basis. One is individuated within anoth
er's primordial commonality. For example, one can be a member
of a team playing football, but still be an individual who happens to
be playing with others.
It is this apparent gap between oneself and the other which
has been a central problem for philosophy and cultural institutions.
The Cartesian world view with its autonomous ego is paradigmatic
for Western Society. It is this perspective of human relations which
Sartre described. 97 By understanding consciousness as a consti
tuting consciousness, isolated for the world, he constituted,· in
stead, the problem of the other. If our consciousness is constitutive
of reality, then it also constitutes the other; but the other is also a
consciousness and thus is constitutive of "me"; that is, ''I'' have be
come an object for him. But this is impossible for Sartre, as con
sciousness cannot be an object. Thus, there is conflict and
alienation, with no hope of reconciliation.
Merleau-Ponty, however, refuted this description. 98 Con
sciousness is an opening out onto the world, it is a perceptual con
sciousness, and thus, there is no problem of another perceiving
consciousness; others are in the world. The other is given to "me"
as being in the world as ''I'' am in the world. ''I'' am given to
"myself" as already being in a situation within an intersubjective
world. In this situation other people are, to some extent, superior
and inferior to "me." But that facticity is resolved through a bodily
dialogue which finds its clearest expression in speech. Through dia
logue we constitute a single world in which we coexist. This human
situation is a primordial commonality upon which all cultural insti
tutions are grounded and which makes community possible.
Although in a formal sense the law accepts the Cartesian per
spective as, for example, in its insistence on free, autonomous will,
in practice, that perspective is abandoned and law operates more
in terms of an intersubjective world. When a jury has to determine
intent, such as criminal or contractual intent, it must reject the au
tonomous ego and look for human action in a common world. In
such a case the other is seen in terms of his actions. 99 We read
from his actions, certain experiences and intentions which do not
97. See generally J. P. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS (1956).
98. See generally M. MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 8, at 346, 369.
99. Id. at 356. See also L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 243-315.
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depend on our gaining access to any "inner experiences or actions"
but which are intelligible because such external actions are modes
of being in the world, modes which we share, which derive from
the human situation. Such a method of determination implicitly re
nounces any separation between consciousness and the body, but
performs an integration which replaces the Cartesian position with
an intersubjective perspective. Such an integration allows us to un
derstand the actions of the other, to deal with him intelligently as
both an individual and as a member of the community. Because we
can understand him, we can judge him, and in judging him we
recognize his individuation with his commonality.
It is against a background of political and social, common and
individual fields of action that the law operates. Since law is a crea
ture of government, but also a social or cultural institution which
reflects that culture and functions within it, law partakes of both
political and social notions of equality: commonality and individual
ity. Being governmental, law imposes a typification of equality onto
parties in a lawsuit. Both political and legal systems establish basic
relationships of equality in the state's relation to its citizens. Thus
the state, through its courts, imposes a typification of equality onto
citizens which sees as relevant factors only those dealing with
membership within the society, such as equal protection of the
law, or a fair and impartial tribunal. Other factors such as religion
or race are deemed irrelevant as not going to the basic sense of the
citizen-state relationship.
As a social institution, law must reflect social realities. There
fore, law does recognize certain social equalities and inequalities.
The problem is one of establishing political equality and recog
nizing social inequality. In seeking to reconcile these different typi
fications, which created equality with recognized inequality, courts
impose a legal typification on both of the other systems. This is a
typification of minimal equality according to which a court deter
mines when the inequality of the social system is so dominant as to
nullify the equality of the political system. The court must balance
the competing interests because it is imposing equality on an ac
cepted system of inequality; it must respond to all the needs and
realities of the society.
Social inequalities are not as such illegal, but great advantage
gained from such inequality by the stronger party can distort the
political equality the government is committed to create. Although
the political system allows social inequalities, it is required to act
in an equal fashion. Thus, the court, which is governmentaL can
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not impose legal consequences which shatter the basic political
equality the government must create. If the court imposed legal
consequences which allowed a stronger party to impose severe con
sequences on a weaker party due to great social inequality, the
court would be participating in maintaining social inequality when
it is required by its governmental status only to recognize such ine
quality but not to act to "establish" it. Using the state to enforce
social inequality is sufficient to trigger the constitutional, political
prohibition against unequal protection of the laws. loo
The court faces the problem of insuring at least a minimal
equality between the parties so as to operate within its institutional
boundaries. This problem and the court's resolution are ex
emplified in Bell v. Tsintolas Realty CO.lOl The essential question
presented was whether tenants proceeding in forma pauperis in
defense to a landlord's summary suit for possession must pay past
due and future rent into the court registry pending resolution of
the case. The court held that this procedure should be followed on
ly in those limited circumstances where it would not unduly tip the
adversarial balance in the litigation. The constitutional procedural
role of the court was seen as "equaliz[ing] the conditions of the ad
versary system for the poor,"102 in both criminal and civil litiga
tion. lo3 This principle of equalization is essential to provide the
poor with meaningful access to and participation in the judicial sys
tem. 104 This principle of adjudicative equalization has been applied
primarily in the context of the state-citizen relationship in terms of
due process and equal protection. I05 In fact, this is the conceptual
basis of the in forma pauperis provision. As a principle of judicial
100. See, e.g., Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
102. Id. at 479.
103. See Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
104. Harris v. Harris, 424 F.2d 806, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
105. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), wherein the court held that
the effective exercise of a statutory right to appeal in criminal cases cannot be con
tingent upon a party's wealth. Thus the state of Illinois was required to provide tran
scripts for indigent criminal defendants. The decision was based upon both equal
protection and due process claims. Justice Harlan, dissenting, argued that only a due
process analysis was relevant and such an analysis did not require such action. Id. at
36-39. The jurisprudential overlap of due process and equal protection concepts in
articulating the fundamental requirements for judicial process in this country is ap
parent in any number of cases. E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (in
validated filing fee requirements in divorce proceedings for indigent persons). The
Court's opinion by Justice Harlan used a due process analysis. Id. at 374. Justice
Douglas' concurring opinion relied on equal protection principles. [d. at 383. Justice
Brennan, concurring, argued both concepts. [d. at 386.
101.
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process, however, it applies to every dispute which involves judi
cial resolution. As previously argued, this principle is inherent in
the nature of a democratic political system and in the developed
political sensibilities of our society. Thus, one may derive adjudica
tive equalization from the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution, or one may ground those provisions
upon the former principle. Resolution of that issue is beyond the
scope and purpose of the present task which is one of preliminary
jurisprudence, that is to describe and thereby to disclose the
ground of the adjudicative process, not to analyze that ground. The
fact is that courts in contract and other cases do practice adjudica
tive equalization in terms of minimal equality. It is precisely this
need to insure equality which directs the court in its use of legal
principles, such as consideration and unconscionability. The court
uses these principles to move the parties into a relationship which
reflects a minimal equality, and this is done either by denying en
forcement, granting enforcement or modifYing the contract and
then enforcing. The court is acting affirmatively in each situation to
create equality if it is not present.
In Webb v. McGowin,106 a relational balance had been
achieved but the estate sought to destroy that balance by having
the contract declared unenforceable. The court, seeking to main
tain a minimal equality in that situation, enforced the contract.
Harrington v. Taylor l07 was the opposite case. No contractual rela
tionship had arisen or was intended. To enforce would have been
to create inequality. Williarns v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,l°s
established a minimal equality between the poverty level consumer
and the stronger businessman by determining whether the latter's
method of maintaining a security interest in goods sold was uncon
scionable. Denying enforcement in such a case deprives the busi
nessman of an undue advantage gained because of great social ine
quality. The court refused to allow legal process to be used as a
means of enforcing undue advantages gained by virtue of great so
cial inequality.
Courts cannot, however, eliminate social inequality. In fact,
they must allow it, because the political system allows it, as long as
that allowance does not eliminate political equality. Thus, hard bar
106.
107.

232 Ala. at 374, 168 So. at 199 (questions of moral consideration).
225 N.C. at 690, 36 S.E.2d at 227 (questions of moral consideration).
108. See note 59 supra and accompanying text discussing questions of un
conscionability.
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gains or unfair exhanges are allowed. Such consequences are within
the tolerable limits of the system. In this way, the courts recognize
social realities and individual differences which the political system
allows, while providing a minimum of equality which that system
requires. This was the case in Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Ap
pliance Co. ,109 in which the social inequality was insufficient to an
nul the sense of political equality the court must maintain. There
fore, even though it was a hard and somewhat unfair bargain, the
court enforced the contract.
Minimal equality, then, as sought in contract law cases, mani
fests the courts' attempt to reconcile their political duty to create
equality with its recognition of social inequality. It is an attempt to
reconcile commonality and individuation in a way designed to
maintain social cohesiveness and political stability.
CONCLUSION

Contract law forms a particular region of legal discourse in
which principles of law are used to maintain a minimal equality in
a reciprocal, bargained relationship between members of the com
munity who submit themselves to its law. By focusing on the use
of the terms "contract," "consideration" or "unconscionability," one
can see contracts asa field of legal discourse comprised of a family
of uses of each term, the use or meaning determined by the
speech situation and the term's grammatical history. This linguistic
field is grounded upon a movement toward minimal equality as the
courts try to reconcile different dimensions of equality as they per
form their political function.
Contract law, then, is an act of the legal system in particular
cases of adjudication. This legal act can only be fully understood
through an analysis of the life-world: the subjective world of the
parties and the judges as the latter seek to understand the actions
of the former. It is only in this doing of law, in this use of the
terms of law, that the meaning of these terms are manifest. To
state it differently, a contract is not a thing, it is a legal concept
whose meaning is contained in the actual speech situations of its
use.
The case method of teaching contract law provides an excel
lent method for explicating this understanding of contracts. Each
case can be seen as a speech situation and the use of the terms can
109. 280 A.2d at 775 (questions of unconscionability). See also text accompa
nying note 81 supra.
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be analyzed in terms of the case, rather than extracted as rules and
considered apart from the context. The student's attention is then
diverted from seeking the "existence" of a contract, and turned to
ward the way courts use the terms "contract" or "consideration."
This refocusing makes the student "process conscious"; it helps
to bring him inside the system rather than having him observe
only the superstructure. When the student looks for family rela
tionships rather than symmetry in the use of legal terms, such as
"contract," he can reconcile cases as being different uses of the
same term within the family, and not despair of inconsistencies.
\Vhat appears to be contradictions are exposed as usages from dif
ferent dimensions of the term's grammar. Furthermore, this kind
of process orientation requires the student to consider the subjec
tive understanding of the actors, and helps him to understand why
that is not speculative. This reorientation to the life-world can ena
ble the student to understand the law as a cultural institution and
help him to appreciate its human dynamic-the ground of its oper
ation in society.
The law of contracts viewed from the above perspective is
compatible with the position of a Kessler llo or a Llewellyn, III but
the methodology is sufficiently different so as to complete the
break with positivism and present a clearer understanding of
contract-Iaw-in-use. What has been proposed is not a new defini
tion of contract, but a method, a way of going about teaching and
understanding the law of contracts. It was only this approach which
was the theme of this essay and not any particular substantive
point.
Finally, an uncritical generalization from the above discussion
to every use of "contract" is not suggested, nor that the function
discussed here is the only function of the courts. Minimal equality,
however, plays a central role in contractual-legal discourse. There
are areas of contract law which seem to emphasize other policies,
such as the problem of illegal contracts. Even here, however, the
court is cognizant of its political role to maintain political equality.
To allow legal condonation of illegal acts violates the notion of po
litical equality by allowing certain citizens to violate the law or con
travene public policy without sanction. Further, such judicial ac
tion would allow the illegal actor to derive social benefits from his
110.
111.
YALE

L.J.

See F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, supra note 62, at 2-14.
See, e.g., Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40
704 (19.31).
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illegal act and thus gain advantage over his law abiding counter
part. Thus, the nonenforcement by courts of illegal contracts is an
attempt by the courts to avoid that misuse of the legal process.
Even in this area, in appropriate instances, a court can construe
the contract, or the particular law or policy the contract contra
venes, to allow enforcement in order to promote a minimal equal
ity,112
The law of contracts, therefore, presents a system of related
speech situations each of which is unique in some respects, but
each of which fits into a coherent pattern of legal discourse. This
article has advanced the thesis that the unifying theme of this co
herent pattern is the search for a minimal equality in contractual
relationships. While only contract adjudication has been discussed,
the methodologies used in the discussion apply to all areas of the
law, and if used generally in legal analysis, will add both to our un
derstanding and to our teaching of law.

112. See, e.g., Liberman v. Rosenthal" 18.5 Misc. 837, .57 N.Y.S.2d 87.5 (Sup. Ct.
194.5); H.O. Meyer Drilling Co. v. Alton V. Phillips Co., 2 Wash. App. 600, 468 P.2d
1008 (1970).

